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Footnotes 
1. See generally, Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and
Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY LAW REVIEW
1505 (1998); Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARV. L.R. 1498, 1528-51 (1993).  Changes in crim-
inal laws, including creating new criminal sanctions to fit the pat-
terns of domestic violence and encouraging the enforcement of
existing criminal sanctions in domestic situations, have also
developed in the last decade.  See Bonnie J. Campbell, U.S.
Department of Justice, A Message from Violence Against Women
Office Director, Bonnie J. Campbell, 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT NEWS, July 1996, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/vawo/
newsletter/bjc796.htm (last modified July 2, 1996).
2. All 50 states and the District of Columbia have some form of pro-
tection order statute. These statutes typically provide for eviction
of the abuser from the home, temporary child custody, and a pro-
hibition against continued abuse.  Some state statutes provide for
monetary relief for the duration of the order.  The duration of the
order varies with each state and ranges from 60 days to 3 years.
See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal
Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and
Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993).
3. See The Family Violence Project of the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Family Violence in Child
Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29
Fam. L.Q. 197 (1995). 
4. See id.
5. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 2, at 812.
6. See, e.g., Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction in DO
ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 1-5 (Eve S. Buzawa &
Carl G. Buzawa, eds., 1996). 
7. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 210-12 (1979);
Molly Chaudhiri & Kathleen Daly.  Do Restraining Orders Help?
Battered Women’s Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 227, 245-47 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa
eds., 1992); Janice Grau et al., Restraining Orders for Battered
Women: Issues of Access and Efficacy, 4 WOMEN & POL., 13, 19-20
(Fall 1984) (concluding that protection orders are most effective in
curtailing abuse when the level of violence is not severe); Lisa G.
Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 61, 70 n.35 (1984).  10  See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT (1994).
8. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT (1994).
9. Comment, The Search for Truth: Admitting Evidence of Prior Abuse in
Cases of Domestic Violence, 20 HAWAII L. REV. 221, 252 (1998)
(hereafter The Search For Truth) (describing the unequal power and
control in abuse relationships, which leads to victims recanting
their allegations, resulting in a “heightened” necessity for admitting
evidence of prior abuse in domestic violence cases.); Lisa Marie
DeSanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice
for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367-
368 (1996) (finding that victims of domestic violence are uncoop-
erative in approximately 80% to 90% of criminal prosecutions).
10. JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM (1999). 
11. See e.g., Comment: Prosecuting Domestic Crimes: Effectively Using
Rule 404(b) to Hold Batterers Accountable for Repeated Abuse, 34
New laws and policies aimed at protecting victims ofdomestic violence have been adopted across the coun-try throughout the last twenty years.  The legal
approaches taken to protect battered women and control fam-
ily violence have brought about significant changes in family
law.1 New laws include statutes permitting civil protection or
restraining orders,2 and laws requiring that domestic violence
be considered in custody and visitation decisions.3 Both of
these types of statutory reforms can provide protection to adult
victims of domestic violence and their children.  Evaluating a
parent’s fitness by considering past acts of violence to other
family members results in decisions that are more likely to pro-
tect children than decisions that discount or disregard spousal
abuse.4 Civil protection orders can provide abused women and
their children with a quick and easily accessible remedy that
provides housing, financial relief, and an order of child cus-
tody.5 While there is some controversy about the effectiveness
of such orders in cases involving severe violence,6 most advo-
cates and scholars agree that these statutes contribute to
improving the lives of women and children.7
The effectiveness of these new laws in reducing the inci-
dence of domestic violence, however, has been limited for a
number of reasons.8 One of the major barriers to using these
laws is the difficulty litigants often encounter when trying to
prove domestic violence.  First, the alleged victim is often the
only witness to the abuse.  For a variety of reasons, victims are
reluctant to testify against their abusers and pursue civil and
criminal remedies.9 Even when they do testify, women who
experience domestic violence sometimes exhibit characteris-
tics that make them less believable. Despite changes in legal
and popular conceptions of domestic violence, judges10 and
juries11 fail to understand some of the effects of domestic vio-
lence and their impact on perceived credibility. 
Experienced practitioners in the area of domestic violence
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GONZ. L. REV. 361, 365 (1998).
12. See, e.g., Joan A. Schroeder, Using Battered Woman Syndrome
Evidence in the Prosecution of the Batterer, 76 IOWA L. REV. 553
(1991); Audrey Stone & Karla Digirolama, Battered Women’s
Expert Testimony, Past and Present, 271 PLI/EST 181 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 800 So. 2d 595 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000) (admitting testimony of domestic violence expert who
described the characteristics of domestic violence and stated vic-
tims often remain in abusive relationship or remain silent about
the abuse).
14. Courts have noted the usefulness of expert opinion.  For exam-
ple, in Pratt v. Wood, 621 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 1994), the court
held that expert testimony in the field of domestic violence was
generally admissible because the average person is uneducated on
the psychological and behavioral characteristics typically shared
by victims of abuse in a familial setting.  Id. at 553.
15. See, e.g., People v. Gomez, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Cal. App. 1999).
In Gomez, the court found that the expert testimony explaining
the victim’s recantation had to be excluded. The court found that
before such testimony could be credited, the prosecution had to
prove that the victim suffered from battered women’s syndrome.
But see People v. Williams, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356 (2000) (“In the
context of the reason for admission of the evidence in this case,
we disagree with the limitation placed on evidence pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1007 in People v. Gomez. There is nothing
in Evidence Code 1107 to suggest that the legislature intended
that a batterer get one free episode of domestic violence before
admission of evidence to explain why a victim of domestic vio-
lence may make inconsistent statements about what occurred and
why such a victim may return to the perpetrator. . . .  Additionally
we believe that the concept of having to prove that a victim of
domestic abuse has previously been battered … is not appropriate
in the context of this case.”); See also People v. Morgan, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 772, 773-74 (1997) (holding that battered women’s syn-
drome expert testimony is admissible to rehabilitate a recanting
victim’s credibility without a proffer of evidence of a preexisting
attempt to introduce as much evidence of the abuse as they can
gather. Established principles of evidence law, however, pre-
sent particular challenges in domestic violence litigation.
While there is expansive literature on evidentiary challenges in
criminal prosecutions for domestic violence, there is very little
written about the way courts have looked at particular eviden-
tiary issues in civil cases in which domestic violence is at issue.
This article is intended to assist judges in anticipating and
responding to some of the evidentiary challenges in civil cases
involving domestic violence.
First, expert testimony is often necessary to dispel common
myths about battered women and to educate judges and juries
about the dynamics of domestic violence.  Recent case law,
however, has limited the admissibility of “non-scientific”
expert testimony, making the court’s qualification of experts
more challenging.  In addition, particular evidentiary issues
arise when alleged victims are pursuing both criminal and civil
remedies against the alleged batterer.  This article explores the
ways that may effect civil actions arising from the domestic
violence.  Finally, we discuss the difficulties in using prior bad
acts evidence.  Because batterers tend to engage in repeated
acts of abuse, evidence of prior acts may be particularly rele-
vant in proving the extent of harm and predicting the likeli-
hood of future abuse.  Traditional principles of evidence law,
however, often prohibit the admission of other crimes, wrongs,
and acts.
I. THE USE OF EXPERT OPINION ON THE EFFECTS OF
BATTERING
When assessing whether domestic violence has occurred,
the court often must understand a complex context and cope
with inevitable misconceptions and incomprehensible contra-
dictions regarding the alleged victim’s perceptions and reac-
tions.  A battered woman’s survival strategies appear maladap-
tive, illogical, and unstable.  For example, despite brutal abuse,
the woman stays in the relationship; she seems to fail to pro-
tect her child from her abuser; her resulting alcohol or drug
abuse may cause her to neglect her child; she may minimize or
deny the abuse; she may appear erratic and unreliable because
she continually relocates to
avoid the abuser.12
Research reveals that a
battered woman remains in
her abusive relationship
because her abuser con-
vinces her she cannot sur-
vive outside the relation-
ship.13 She may rationalize
that her child’s need for a
father outweighs the dam-
age of his abuse.  She may
realistically fear that he will
kill her if she escapes, or she
may simply believe she can-
not afford to support herself and her child without him. Expert
opinion illuminates these paradoxes for the judge or jury.14
Three types of expert opinions facilitate an understanding of
the dynamics and perspectives underlying a domestic violence
relationship: (1) the clinically based opinion, (2) the social
framework opinion, and (3) a hybrid of the clinically based and
social framework opinions.  The clinically based expert assesses
the relationship and can offer opinion evidence about the par-
ticular effects of battering on this specific relationship. Social
framework experts put clinical data in perspective, usually
without any clinical relationship with the parties.  The social
framework expert clarifies the contradictions and the miscon-
ceptions regarding domestic abuse. The hybrid expert offers a
clinical opinion about the abuse and effects in this particular
relationship and explains the behavior of the abused person.  
Too often, courts limit expert opinion to clinically based
testimony and are more skeptical of useful social framework
testimony.  This limitation may result from an erroneous belief
that battered women’s syndrome testimony remains the only
admissible expert testimony in a domestic violence case.15
Although evidence regarding battered women’s syndrome can
be used to establish a self-defense claim to murder or assault
under some state’s laws, it remains inadequate when attempt-
ing to explain fundamental contradictions within an abusive
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abusive relationship between victim and defendant).
16. The battered women’s syndrome has come under significant criti-
cism in recent years.  Many critics suggest that it perpetuates neg-
ative stereotypes about victims of violence and tends to patholo-
gize their natural reactions to abuse.  See, e.g., DONALD DOWNS,
MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY, AND
THE LAW (1998); EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, BATTERED
WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS (1988); Pamela Posch, The Negative Effects of Expert
Testimony on the Battered Women’s Syndrome, 6 AM. U.J. GENDER &
L. 485 (1998); Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
17. See, e.g., Paula Finley Mangum, Note, Reconceptualizing Battered
Woman Syndrome Evidence: Prosecution Use of Expert Testimony on
Battering, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 593 (1999) (exploring and
evaluating the use of expert testimony in the prosecution of a bat-
terer); Cynthia Lynn Barnes, Supplement Annotation, Admissibility
of Expert Testimony Concerning Domestic-Violence Syndromes to
Assist Jury in Evaluating Victim’s Testimony or Behavior, 57 A.L.R.
5TH 315 (1998) (collecting and analyzing criminal cases in which
the courts considered whether and when expert testimony regard-
ing domestic violence syndromes may be used to assist the jury in
evaluating a victim’s testimony or conduct); Audrey E. Stone,
Presenting Battered Women’s Expert Testimony: Trial And Error, in
HANDLING THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE 1998, at 255 (PLI New
York Practice Skills Course Handbook Series No. F0-001V, 1998)
(discussing that prosecutors increasingly find it useful to use
experts in domestic violence cases to explain the conduct of a vic-
tim, such as when a victim recants, changes her story, or contin-
ues to live with the perpetrator); Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis:
Expert Testimony on Battering and its Effect in Criminal Cases, 11
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 75 (1996) (providing information and analysis
about expert testimony in cases involving battered women);
Steven I. Platt, Women Accused of Homicide: the Use of Expert
Testimony on Effect of Battering on Women—A Trial Judge’s
Perspective, 25 U. BALT. L. REV. 33 (1995).
18. See e.g., Pratt v. Wood, 620 N.Y.S. 2d 551 (App. Div. 1994).  For a
general review of the use of social framework evidence, see
Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use
of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987); and Michael J.
Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA L. REV.
1011 (1990).
19. See Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L .REV. 414 (1952).
20. See id.; see also Donald G. Dutton  with Susan K. Golant, THE
BATTERER, A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE (1995).
21. Ohio Evid. Rule 702, BALDWIN’S OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (West
2000).
22. State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).
23. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (holding
that the question of admissibility of expert testimony is review-
able under “abuse of discretion” standard).
24. See MARY ANN DUTTON, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE
CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
[Research Report, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice and U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, National Institute of Mental Health, NCJ
160972 (1996)]. 
25. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir. 1997) (dis-
senting judge calls into question the objectivity of the expert
because she worked for a child advocacy center). 
26. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999)
(holding that an inquiry into both relevance and reliability applies
not only to “scientific” testimony but to all expert testimony).
27. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-
relationship.16 There is an
abundance of social science
literature on abuse. Courts
often undervalue social-
framework testimony because
they view it as general infor-
mation rather than specific
application.  While many aca-
demics have heralded the use
of domestic violence expert
opinion in criminal cases, few
have discussed its use in the
civil arena.17
Social framework opinion
evidence often assists the fact-finder in understanding the evi-
dence or in determining a fact relevant to material issues.
Therefore, it fits the requirements of Rule 702 or its common-
law equivalent.18 A litigant may challenge this expert opinion
as within the common experience of the fact-finder urging the
court to disallow the expert because such information remains
unnecessary or not “beyond his or her ken.” 19 On the contrary,
most common experience regarding abuse remains a miscon-
ception.20 A few states directly address the need to admit
expert opinion evidence to correct common misconceptions
regarding abuse.  For example, Ohio Rule 702 includes the lan-
guage, “A witness may testify as an expert if...[t]he witness’
testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or
experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception
common among lay persons.” (Emphasis added). 21 The Ohio
legislature changed Rule 702 after the issue was raised about
expert opinion regarding domestic violence.22 Judicial discre-
tion in admitting this evidence is substantial.  A trial court’s
admission or denial of expert testimony faces abuse of discre-
tion review.23 This makes it all the more important that such
rulings are well considered at the trial level. 
Courts that admit this evidence face additional hurdles.  For
example, in domestic violence cases, “experts” often lack edu-
cational degrees. Rules regarding expert opinion specifically
allow expertise based on experience.  Therefore, domestic vio-
lence workers may qualify as experts to testify regarding their
knowledge of abuse arising from their experience working
with women in shelters or other settings.24 Even when an
expert possesses the requisite educational degree, courts may
be urged to reject the opinion as insufficiently “scientific.”  A
litigant may characterize domestic violence experts as “advo-
cates,” lacking in “scientific distance.”25 This view damages the
expert’s credibility, limits the effectiveness of the expert testi-
mony, and may cause disqualification of the expert.
Recent United States Supreme Court rulings on expert opin-
ion may have had the effect of privileging scientific inquiry.26
This may increase the court’s use of standard scientific require-
ments, like testability, peer review, publication, rate of error,
and general acceptance.27 These scientific requirements often
inappropriately assess the worth of social science studies or the
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95 (1993).
28. But see generally David L. Faigman, The Syndromic Lawyer
Syndrome: A Psychological Theory of Evidentiary Munificence, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 817 (1996) (discussing a misappprehension among
lawyers about both the difficulty of doing social science research
and the law’s proper response when social science is difficult to
conduct).
29. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test
still remains quite viable in many states.  Essentially, for expert
opinion to be admitted, it must be scientific knowledge derived
through a method that is generally accepted among the relevant
scientific authorities.  This test places part of the decision about
whether this evidence is “reliable” outside the court and within
the purview of scientists. 
30. California Evidence Code section 1107 provides in pertinent part:
In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible 
. . . regarding battered women’s syndrome, including the
physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs,
perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence
. . . .
The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this expert
testimony if the proponent of the evidence establishes its rele-
vancy and the proper qualifications of the expert witness.  Expert
opinion testimony on battered women’s syndrome shall not be
considered a new scientific technique whose reliability is
unproven.
31. Keesee v. Keesee, 675 So.2d 655, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(Griffin, J. concurring).
32. See generally, Myrna Raeder, The Better Way: The Role of Batterers’
Profiles and Expert “Social Framework” Background in Cases
Implicating Domestic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 147 (1997)
(proposing a reformulated model for the use of expert testimony in
domestic-violence-related cases wherein prosecutors would be per-
mitted to introduce domestic-violence social-science framework
evidence that is not syndrome or profile oriented in order to level
the evidentiary playing field and provide a background against
which domestic violence evidence can be understood at trial).
33. See, e.g., Garces v. Garces, 704 So.2d 1106, 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998).  In Garces, the wife’s expert psychologist testified
about the wife’s psychological condition as a result of domestic
abuse. The psychologist recommended that the wife consult with
a psychiatrist at least once monthly and that the wife should
attend individual therapy twice a week for at least a few years.
The trial court included in the final judgment the following pro-
vision: “The husband shall be required to pay any presently out-
standing and all reasonable future medical, psychological, psychi-
atric, counseling and medication expenses for care and treatment
required by the wife as a result of his egregious conduct which are
not covered by her medical insurance and for those items which
are covered, the husband shall be responsible for any uncovered
portions, including payment of any deductibles.”). 
34. Sometimes the judge needs no expert to see the risks posed by plac-
ing the child with a violent person.  Judges generally award unsu-
pervised visitation in these cases. See, e.g., Berg v. Berg, 606 N.W.2d
clinical experience of the expert.28 In those states relying on
the Frye standard, the court may find that such expert opinion
is not “generally accepted in the scientific community.”29
Some states specifically address this problem.  For example,
the California evidence code specifically exempts social frame-
work evidence from the Frye test when offered to educate the
fact-finder about the common misconceptions regarding a vic-
tim’s behavior.30
In a case where testimony included a tape recording of a
violent incident in which the husband battered the wife with a
camcorder after threatening to “smash [her] face in” in front of
the children on Christmas morning, a concurring Florida
appellate judge voiced his discomfort regarding the reliability
and competence of a court-appointed expert in the case:
I am bound to say, however, that I am increasingly
concerned about the proliferating and extensive use of
psychologists in these family law cases and the extreme
reliance trial courts appear to place on their opinions.
These experts conduct interviews, sometimes do tests
and then are allowed to render opinions on an extraor-
dinary range of subjects.  They have been allowed to
offer opinions on a why a child nestles with its parent
(no, it’s not necessarily love), whether someone is
prone to domestic violence, who is telling the truth,
and who is “in denial.” Yet, no one seems to be able to
muster any measure of the competence or reliability of
these opinions.  On the one hand, it is certainly desir-
able to bring before the court as much evidence as pos-
sible to assist the trial court in making the best decision
concerning the raising of the children in families torn
by divorce.  On the other hand, the rules of evidence
exist for a reason, and the
issue of competency of
such broad reach of expert
testimony is not some-
thing that should be taken
lightly—particularly in
such cases where there is
frequently little other
objective or disinterested
evidence on which the
court can rely.31
Despite some courts’ reluctance, social framework testi-
mony remains critical in domestic violence cases to explain
victim behavior.32 Experts are often the only witnesses who
can educate the fact-finder regarding the unfathomable
dynamics underlying domestic violence relationships, and the
subtle, confusing facts of abuse. 
People inexperienced with domestic violence usually won-
der why a victim did not escape her abuser.  This issue arises
in requests for orders of protection (why now?), in custody
determinations (if he is so abusive, why did you stay and
expose the children to this?), in requests for rehabilitative
maintenance33 (why did you leave college while you were mar-
ried and now want him to pay?), in tort actions (you consented
to this treatment, so why should you be heard to complain
now?), and in myriad other settings.   Expert opinion explains
why the victims minimize abuse and keep abuse a secret from
friends, family, clergy, or physicians.  
Domestic violence experts facilitate custody determina-
tions.34 It is often heard in the halls of family courts that some-
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895, 899 (N.D. 2000) (although the statute places a heavy burden
of proof—clear and convincing evidence—upon the perpetrator of
domestic violence to show unsupervised visitation will not harm
the child, the statute imposes no burden on the custodial parent to
prove, by expert testimony or otherwise, that unsupervised visita-
tion with the more violent parent will in fact harm the child).
35. The Link Between Child Abuse and Domestic Violence, CHILD
PROTECTION LEADER (American Humane Association Sept. 1994). 
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1998) (holding expert
testimony is allowed but not required to prove effects of domestic
violence on child’s emotional and mental state); In re Marriage of
Brainard, 523 N.W.2d 611 (Iowa App. 1994) (admitting expert
testimony to detail the tragic and long-term consequences of
spousal abuse on children who witness the violence); In re
Marriage of Houtchens, 760 P.2d 71 (Mont. 1988) (allowing
expert in field of social work and domestic violence to testify that
children are at risk living with men who batter, both because of
the likelihood that the child will be battered and the likelihood
that the child will rely on that person as a role model); Chafin v.
Rude, 391 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. App. 1986) (allowing court’s
expert to testify that domestic violence jeopardized the child’s
emotional development).
38. AMERICAN JUDGES FOUNDATION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & THE
COURTROOM: UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM, KNOWING THE VICTIM.
This publication is periodically updated; the current version can
be found at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/domviol/booklet.html. 
39. “Friendly parent” provisions are typically legislation that consid-
ers which parent is most likely to foster the relationship with the
other parent and considers that behavior as a positive factor in
determining the best interests of the child. Manuel E. Nestle,
Child Custody Determination on Termination of Marriage, in 34 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 407.
40. See Faries v. Faries, 607 So.2d 1204, 1208 (Miss. 1992) (clinical
social worker testified (1) that victim struggled with low self-
esteem, (2) that her low coping skills indicated her husband emo-
tionally abused her, and (3) that her condition would not prevent
her from caring for the children).
41. See, e.g., In the Matter of J.D. v. N.D,  652 N.Y.S. 2d 468 (1996)
(finding that the respondent was engaging in protective behavior in
response to the petitioner’s exercise of power and control over her).
42. Windham v. Windham, 616 So.2d 276, 297 (La. App. 1993).
43. Faries, 607 So.2d at 1210.
44. To qualify for the “learned treatise” exception to the hearsay rule,
an expert must testify and affirm that the treatise is authoritative,
or the party offering the treatise must prove its reliable authority
by another expert or by judicial notice.  This essentially allows the
party to offer the information through an expert and minimize the
costs of production of an expert or allows a party to cross-exam-
ine that expert without having to hire a battering expert.  See Fed.
one beats his wife but is a good
father.  Recent literature illu-
minates the fallacy of such a
belief.  Forty-five to 70% of
battered women in shelters
report that their batterers com-
mit some form of child
abuse.35 Even using the more
conservative figure, child abuse is 15 times more likely to occur
in households in which there is domestic violence.36 Moreover,
children simply witnessing domestic violence without them-
selves being abused are still more likely to grow up with serious
maladaptive behavior patterns.   Experts facilitate custody deter-
minations by offering insight into the current and potential
effects on children in a domestic violence household.37
It as been estimated that approximately 70% of contested
custody cases that involve a history of domestic violence result
in an award of sole or joint custody to the abuser.38 Such
awards may result from the recent trend in which more and
more states adopt “friendly parent” provisions as a factor in
assessing which parent should receive custody of the chil-
dren.39 A mother may find herself in a “Catch-22.”  If she fails
to report the abuse, the court labels her an ineffective or
neglectful mother failing to protect her child.  If she reports the
abuse, the court may label her an “unfriendly parent” afflicted
with parental alienation syndrome, and she may lose custody
of her child.  This trend necessitates a critical distinction
between an “unfriendly parent” and a mother attempting to
protect herself and her child from the abuser, particularly
when a victim minimizes her abuse or engages in maladaptive
self-help behaviors.40 Again, in such a situation, expert opin-
ion critically educates the fact-finder.41
Expert opinion may assist in sorting out particularly difficult
determinations. Of course, when parties make competing
claims, either or both parties may use experts, and these experts
may be court appointed. For example, a Louisiana court faced
a husband who physically abused his wife but not his minor
child.42 The court admitted testimony of a court-appointed
psychologist.  The expert testified that the father remained a
stronger nurturer than the mother.  The court ordered joint cus-
tody primarily because the mother prevented the father from
seeing the child, and the joint custody provision of the
Louisiana statute promoted a frequent and continuing relation-
ship with both parents. In contrast, a Mississippi court faced a
father asserting that his wife was unfit to care for their chil-
dren.43 The court admitted testimony of a clinical social
worker. The expert testified that the mother struggled with low
self-esteem, that her low coping skills indicated her husband
emotionally abused her, and that her condition would not pre-
vent her from caring for her children. The court affirmed the
award of custody to the father based on the chancellor’s findings
that the father had cared for the children while the mother was
in school, that his possession of the house provided the chil-
dren stability of a home environment in familiar surrounding,
and that the mother had hidden the children for 23 days.
As useful as experts may be, they are often costly and
impractical. The summary nature of order of protection hear-
ings makes calling an expert unlikely even if the party could
find and afford one. If an expert is testifying in a civil action,
costs can be substantially reduced through the introduction of
“learned treatise” type evidence, relying on articles from rep-
utable journals to assist in evaluating the social framework of
the case.44 This can also be offered by briefing the court and
opposing party on the relevant issue, with expert writings used
to educate the court about the effect of the domestic violence
on the woman and her children. 
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R. Evid. 803(18). 
45. An excited utterance is admissible if the statement relates to a
startling event and is made while under the stress of that excite-
ment.  See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). 
46. Many jurisdictions are using “victimless prosecution” strategies
thus necessitating creative application of the hearsay exceptions.
Some states are even creating evidentiary rules that reduce the
reliance on victims in these prosecutions.  See CAL. EVID. CODE §
1370 (1997). This evidentiary rule allows the admission of
hearsay statements in a domestic violence case if such a statement
narrates, describes, or explains the infliction or threat of physical
injury and the declarant is unavailable to testify.  The statement
must have been made within at least five years of the infliction of
injury and must be written, electronically recorded, or provided
to a law enforcement official.  
47. For a detailed and thoughtful discussion of “victimless prosecu-
tions,” see Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose, Mandated Victim
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1996). 
48. A public record generally requires either the testimony of a cus-
todian of records, a document under seal, or, in some states, a
“business record affidavit” establishing the authenticity of the
document.  The document must be produced by a public agency
and generally includes reports setting forth the activities of the
office or agency, matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by
law as to which matters there is a duty to report (this likely cov-
ers the police report at the scene) or factual findings resulting
from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law.
See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).
49. Missouri, like many states, allows the introduction of business
records without the custodian provided the party offering the
business record has an affidavit from the custodian of records
swearing to the foundation and timely notice is given to the
opposing party.  MO. REV. STAT. § 490.692 (2001).
50. Generally, police reports cannot be used against criminal defen-
dants in criminal actions due to their confrontation clause impli-
cations. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.803(8)(2002); AR EVID. RULE
803(8)(2002); IOWA R. EVID. 5.803(8)(2002); 12 OKLA. ST. §2803
(2003); D.R.E. 803(8)(2002).  Some states also limit the use of
police reports in civil actions. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §
908.03(8)(2002); MINN. EVID. RULE 803(8)(2001); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§8C-1. Rule 803(2002).
51. Actual physical violence is not required to prove that the event
was “startling” for purposes of establishing an excited utterance.
A threat should be enough. See Donna Meredith Matthews,
Making the Connection: A Proposed Threat Hearsay Exception, 27
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 117, 138 (1997).
52. See, e.g., Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988);
State v. Woodward, 908 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1995); State v. Anderson,
723 P.2d 464 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
53. The state of mind exception to the hearsay rule admits any state-
ments by a declarant that concerns that declarant’s then-existing
state of mind, emotional sensation, or physical condition.  This
includes statements of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feel-
ing, pain or bodily health, but not statements of past condition.
See, e.g.,  Fed. R. Evid. 803(3).  
54. Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment include
statements describing present symptoms and past medical history
as long as the statements are designed to elicit medical care.  This
certainly covers statements made to a treating physician that are
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.  If the victim seeks care
through the police officer taking the call, then her statements
might qualify for an exception.  However, if she merely is report-
ing the events and not seeking medical care then the statements
II. EVIDENTIARY IMPLICATIONS OF CONCURRENT CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Often, order of protection hearings occur in the shadow of
a criminal prosecution for assault.  This creates particular evi-
dentiary issues that have both substantive and strategic impli-
cations.  Police practices in anticipation of a criminal prosecu-
tion may be different.  Police often play a more active role in
gathering physical evidence, obtaining 911 tapes and medical
records of treatment following the incident.  Instead of merely
writing a brief report of a domestic dispute, many police forces
are being trained to produce police reports that record “excited
utterances”45 and other hearsay exceptions within the docu-
ment.46 Therefore, the police report can be used to conduct
“victimless prosecutions” when the victim decides to withdraw
the criminal complaint and does not wish to testify.47 These
more detailed investigations and reports can be quite useful as
supplemental and corroborating evidence of the domestic
abuse in the protection hearing and subsequent divorce or cus-
tody proceedings.  
The foundation requirements for the police record are the
same as those for a public record.48 Many states allow such
records to be authenticated by affidavit provided notice is
given to the other party.49 Unlike a criminal case, the record
can be used against the alleged perpetrator without the police
officer present and subject to cross-examination.50 Being able
to use the police report without the officer’s presence and tes-
timony may be particularly important in an order of protection
hearing because the cases tend to be heard on an expedited
basis, the parties are often
unrepresented, and the pro-
ceedings are often summary
in nature.  
Any hearsay statements
included in the report must
also meet hearsay excep-
tions.  “Excited utterances”
may be the most likely
hearsay exception covering
a victim or witness’s state-
ment if the report is taken at
the scene and only shortly
after, or during, the violent
incident.51 The timing can be significant.  If the police arrived
within 30 minutes of the assault, then the statements are likely
to qualify.52 Longer lapses of time may make this a more diffi-
cult argument.  Other hearsay exceptions that may cover vic-
tim or witness statements within the police documentation
include present sense impressions (in some jurisdictions),
state of mind exception (provided her state of mind is an issue
in the case),53 and statements made for medical diagnosis or
treatment.54
The hearing on the protection order is likely to occur prior
to the prosecution and becomes a source for discovery and
preservation of testimony.  This cuts both ways for the parties.
The future prosecution may create an imbalance in the court-
room.  In anticipation of the criminal prosecution, it is far
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will not qualify.   See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). 
55. See MO. REV. STAT. §.455.060(3) (1999) (mandating that findings
in an order of protection hearing are not res judicata).
56. See A. HARRELL, ET AL., COURT PROCESSING AND THE EFFECTS OF
RESTRAINING ORDERS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS (Urban
Institute 1993).
57. In the majority of state courts, the “law of evidence” has been
incorporated into a code of evidence.  In many of these codes,  the
section numbers and content conform with the Federal Rules of
Evidence.  CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
MODERN EVIDENCE 51.2 at 4 (1994).  The references in this article
to Rule 404(b) evidence refer to evidence of other acts of abuse.
About a dozen states have no comprehensive code of evidence but
rather an amalgam of rules derived from case law, statutes, and
constitutionally based rules.  In these states case law has devel-
oped which defines the parameters of the exclusion of prior bad
act evidence. Id.
58. Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 402. 
59. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
60. Fed. Rule Evid. 404(b) states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that
upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal
case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause
shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.
Although the evidence is commonly referred to as “prior”
crimes or bad acts, the federal rule (and most state counter-
parts) includes evidence of acts committed both before and
after the incident at issue in the litigation.
61. EDWARD W. CLEARY ET. AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 at 637
(5th ed. 1999). 
62. Other policy reasons for excluding prior bad act evidence relate
primarily to criminal prosecutions for domestic violence and are
generally focused on guaranteeing the presumption of innocence.
For example, if evidence that a defendant committed a similar
crime is admitted, a jury may require less than proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt because the defendant is not an “innocent” party
or, in the case of prior uncharged crimes, because he needs to be
more likely that the respon-
dent has retained counsel
whereas the victim may still
be without representation.
An alleged perpetrator can
use the hearing to preview
the future criminal case.
The testimony of the victim
often provides a source of
impeachment material, par-
ticularly if she is unrepre-
sented.   This may become a
time to vigorously cross-
examine the victim and
witnesses in the hopes of discouraging them from going for-
ward with the prosecution.  
Some criminal attorneys have sought continuances in the
protection order hearings, citing their client’s Fifth
Amendment privilege not to be forced to testify.  Although
delays do not leave victims unprotected (the temporary stay
away order is usually extended), the victim is denied other
relief that may be necessary for her to sustain separation, such
as court-ordered mortgage payments by the perpetrator, child
support, and protected visitation.  In some cases, the law lim-
its the number of continuances that can be granted and courts
face the task of determining whether to deny the victim her
relief or perhaps violate the Fifth Amendment right of the per-
petrator.  Some states have attempted to remedy this problem
by preventing the use of the respondent’s testimony in any
future proceeding and by ensuring that the finding of abuse is
not treated as res judicata (for future claims in which a finding
of abuse could have an impact on the determination).55
On the other hand, alleged victims can benefit from the pro-
tection hearing occurring before the prosecution.  Future crim-
inal defendants may also provide inculpatory testimony in this
setting when testifying about the alleged abuse.  The timing of
the protection hearing increases the likelihood that the lawyer
for the defendant in the criminal case has not done sufficient
investigation of the case, has had little time to understand the
story from the alleged perpetrator’s perspective, and is reason-
ably reluctant to allow the client to discuss the issue under
oath.   Such testimony may be admissible in the subsequent
prosecution for both its impeachment and substantive value as
party admissions.  A represented victim may therefore be at a
decided advantage in settlement.  To avoid a finding of abuse
and to keep the defendant off the stand, a respondent may be
willing to negotiate with his victim to create an order that may
not otherwise be available after a hearing.56 These provisions
include matters such as child support, maintenance, super-
vised visitation, disposal of household guns, mandated drug
tests as a condition of visitation, and repayment of the costs
associated with the violence. 
III. INTRODUCING EVIDENCE OF PATTERN OF ABUSE
IN CIVIL CASES 
The law of evidence in most states57 is governed by general
principles favoring admissibility as long as the evidence is rel-
evant58 and is not unduly prejudicial.59 Thus, most rules of
evidence have developed as exclusionary rules—that is, the
evidence is presumed admissible unless some  rule of evidence
excludes it.  Trial judges have wide discretion in balancing the
probative value of evidence against its potentially prejudicial
impact.  
One of the long-standing categories of evidence that is gen-
erally excluded is evidence of other charged and uncharged
crimes and bad acts.60 The so-called “propensity rule”61 pro-
hibits the introduction of prior bad acts to prove that the
defendant acted in conformity with his bad character. The the-
ory is that a judge or jury will convict or hold the defendant
liable, not on proof of the wrong charged, but because he has
a propensity to commit similar crimes or bad acts.62 Although
rules against admission of this type of evidence are most often
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punished for the prior act.  
63. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s
Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which
Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 574, 576 (1990).
64. The Search for Truth, supra note 9, at 240, citing Anne L. Ganley,
Understanding Domestic Violence in IMPROVING THE HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM’S RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  A RESOURCE MANUAL
FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 18 (1995). See also, Letendre, Beating
Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule of Evidence
Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 973
(2000).
65. See, e.g., MD. FAM. LAW ART. § 4-504 (b)(ii)(1) (requiring inclu-
sion of prior abuse in petitions for protection); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 634   R.634.20 (WEST 1996); ARIZ. R.S. § 13-3602 (West 2000)
(“The court shall issue an order of protection . . . if the court
determines that there is reasonable cause to believe . . . the defen-
dant has committed an act of domestic violence within the past
year. . . .”); CAL. FAM. § 6300 (“an order may be issued to restrain
any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domes-
tic violence. . . if an affidavit shows. . . reasonable proof of a past
act or acts of abuse.”).   
66. 674 A.2d 951 (Md. App. 1996).    
67. Id. at 258-259.  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
also approved the admission of evidence of prior abuse in protec-
tion order cases noting that “a [batterer’s] past conduct is . . . per-
haps the most important [evidence] of his probable future con-
duct. . . . This is especially true in the context of a marital or sim-
ilar relationship.”   Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 930 (D.C.
App. 1991) (citation omitted).
68. 674 A.2d at 260.  The Coburn court also offered a related justifi-
cation for admitting prior abuse evidence in noting that the char-
acter of the accused as an abuser is at issue in protection order
proceedings.  Id. at 260-61.  Even where the statute doesn’t direct
the court to consider history of abuse, it can be argued character
is directly at issue in custody and visitation cases where fitness of
invoked by defense attorneys in criminal cases, these rules
apply in both civil and criminal cases in most jurisdictions.63
Evidence of prior bad acts are especially relevant and pro-
bative in domestic violence cases because of the cyclical nature
of domestic violence.  As one commentator described it:
Domestic violence is never a single isolated inci-
dent.  Rather, domestic violence is a pattern of behav-
ior, with each episode connected to the others.  Many
times, as the pattern of abuse evolves, the level of
seriousness escalates.  In the most unfortunate
instances, the consequence of domestic violence is
homicide.  By allowing evidence of past specific inci-
dents of abuse in domestic violence cases, courts
could help to prevent this escalation.64
Prior acts of abuse are often necessary to prove to the fact-
finder the nature and seriousness of the abuse involved.  One
act of abuse may not warrant the same remedy as when there
has been a pattern of abuse between the parties.  Different reme-
dies are required when there is an isolated act of abuse that is
unlikely to be repeated as compared to a serious act of abuse
following a pattern of abuse.  The more abuse that occurred in
the past means a higher likelihood that future acts of abuse will
occur and, thus, the need for greater protective measures.     
Courts of limited jurisdiction that hear some domestic vio-
lence cases—protection orders and crimes classified as
minor—may not strictly apply the rules of evidence.  The tra-
ditional hesitancy to admit prior bad act evidence, therefore,
may not apply.  In other cases, where one or both of the liti-
gants are pro se, objections to this type of evidence will prob-
ably not be made.  In many cases, however, where the rules of
evidence are observed and parties are represented, the court is
likely to encounter evidentiary challenges to prior abuse evi-
dence.  A litigant may rely upon a variety of theories when
arguing for admission of pattern of abuse evidence in protec-
tion order or other civil proceedings where domestic violence
is at issue.  First, in some circumstances, the general prohibi-
tion on admitting prior bad acts evidence does not apply.  This
argument would be particularly persuasive when the statute
relied upon instructs the
court, either directly or indi-
rectly, to consider a history or
pattern of abuse.  Many pro-
tection order statutes, for
example, include a directive
to the petitioner to include
the incidents of past abuse in
the petition or may direct the
court to consider a history of
domestic violence before
granting particular relief in
the order.65
In Coburn v. Coburn,66 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed a trial court’s admission of prior evidence of abuse in
a protection order proceeding.  The court noted that the lan-
guage in Maryland’s protection order statute included both a
directive to the petitioner to include prior acts of abuse and
required consideration of the history of abuse before granting
certain kinds of relief under the statute.  After analyzing the
protection order statute’s references to past abuse, the court
concluded that the statutory references demonstrated the rel-
evance of past abuse evidence in deciding whether and what
kind of protection order should issue.67 The court went on
to state: 
The policy consideration underlying the general
prohibition against admission of evidence of prior
crimes or bad acts is that such evidence tends to prej-
udice the defendant because the trier of fact will
improperly use the evidence to determine the ultimate
issue of guilt.  This rationale does not apply in a civil
protective order hearing where the ultimate issue is
what, if any, remedy is necessary to protect the peti-
tioner based on the likelihood of future abuse.
Evidence of past abusive acts is admissible to show
that abuse is likely to recur and to help the court deter-
mine what remedies will adequately prevent future
abuse.  Hence, Md. Rule 5-404(b) is inapplicable and
evidence of prior incidents of abuse is admissible.68
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one or both parents is a primary consideration.
69. Boniek v. Dunick, 443 N.W. 2d 196, 198 (Minn. 1989) (finding
that text under the Domestic Abuse Act, “past abusive behavior,”
although not dispositive, is a factor in determining cause for pro-
tection”).  
70. Strollo v. Strollo, 828 P.2d 532 (Utah 1992) (reversing a trial court
decision denying a protection order and finding that the language
of the protection order statute required the court to consider past
abuse).
71. Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 775 A.2d 1249 (Md. 2001).
72. See Family Violence Project, supra note 1.   
73. Id.
74. Id. at 204.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT § 25-403 (2001);  COLO REV. STAT. ANN. §
14-10-124 (West 1997); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (West 2000);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16
(2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (2000). 
77. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2)(b)(2) (2000); IDAHO CODE SEC. 32-
717 (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (West 1997); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518.17 subd. 2(d) West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-05-22.3 (2000); OKLA STAT. TIT. 10 § 21.1(d) (West 2000). 
78. See e.g., David M. Gersten, Criminal Practice; Evidentiary Trends In
Domestic Violence Cases, 72 FLA. BAR J. 65, 67 (1998) (discussing
language of Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Delaware, and
Florida custody statutes, which direct the court to consider past
abuse).  In some cases, however, the victim’s ability to introduce
evidence of past abuse is limited to certain types of evidence such
as felony convictions.  Id.  
79. See Gersten, Evidentiary Trends in Domestic Violence, 72 FLA. B.J.
65 (Aug. 1998). For example, Florida requires a conviction for a
third-degree felony or higher to establish a rebuttable presump-
tion that will preclude joint custody. See FLA. STAT. §
61.13(2)(b)(2)(2000). 
80. IDAHO CODE § 32-717(1997).
81. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 649 So. 2d 799 (La. Ct. App.
1995); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 886 S.W. 2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994); Brown v. Brown, 867 P.2d 477 (Okla. 1993). 
82. OKLA. STA. TIT. 43, § 112.2 (2001 Supp.).
83. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), supra note 15. 
84. 593 A.2d 186 (D.C. App. 1999).  See also State v. Featherman, 651
P.2d 868 (Ariz. 1982) (acknowledging the significance of under-
standing the pattern of abuse in the relationship of the defendant
and victim to prove both motive and intent); People v. Thompson,
314 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. App. 1981) (evidence of prior bad acts,
such as threats to kill the victim, admissible to establish motive
for assault with intent to do great bodily harm). 
Other courts have also relied
on either the implicit69 or
explicit70 language of the pro-
tection order statute to find that
the court should admit and con-
sider evidence of past abuse
when issuing a protection order.
At least one appellate court
has found evidence of prior
abuse relevant to assess the rea-
sonableness of a woman’s “fear of imminent bodily harm”
under a state’s protection order statute.  In holding that a
woman’s fear from her husband’s act must be evaluated in the
context of prior abuse in the relationship, the court held:
A person who has been subjected to [abuse] may
well be sensitive to nonverbal signals or code words
that have proved threatening in the past to that victim
but which to someone else, not having that experi-
ence would not perceive to be threatening.71
In child custody and visitation cases, evidence of domestic
violence is often a critical part of the best interests assessment.
Most custody and visitation statutes direct the court to con-
sider the parties’ history of abuse.72 Most states require con-
sideration of domestic violence as a factor in the best interest
analysis.73 Almost every state requires courts to consider the
presence of abuse when making such determinations.74 The
effect of this evidence varies among the states. 75 Some states
prohibit the award of custody to a parent who has been found
to have committed domestic violence in the past.76 Others
have created a rebuttable presumption against awarding cus-
tody or visitation to the abusive parent.77 Courts vary in the
amount of evidence of abuse that they deem necessary to trig-
ger a finding that a parent has engaged in domestic violence.78
Some states require a conviction for a serious domestic vio-
lence-related crime. 79 Other states look for a pattern of vio-
lence.  Idaho requires a “habitual perpetrator,”80 Louisiana,
Missouri, and Oklahoma require that the abuse be ongoing or
part of a pattern of conduct.81 In most states, a mere prepon-
derance of evidence will suffice to prove domestic violence for
purpose of affecting the custodial decision.  Oklahoma, how-
ever, requires that such evidence be “clear and convincing.”82
In all of these situations, the legislature in the state has created
a “statutory exception” to the Rule 404(b) counterpart, thus
making prior bad acts evidence admissible.  
Dealing with objections to this kind of evidence when there
is arguably no statutory exception is more difficult.  Evidence
of prior domestic violence may be admissible under well-rec-
ognized exceptions to Rule 404(b).  Most rules prohibiting
admission of prior bad acts to prove character or propensity
permit the admission of such evidence when it is relevant to a
non-character issue such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of a
mistake, or accident.83 Case law on these exceptions in the
domestic violence area has focused primarily on criminal pros-
ecutions.   In Clark v. United States,84 for example, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed a case in which a man
who had killed his paramour claimed that he had done so by
accident.  The court held that “an attempt to restrict the vio-
lence [between the parties] to the events of the fatal evening
would unreasonably cramp the inquiry, to the detriment of the
search for truth.”  The court recognized in this and other cases
that the likelihood of mistake or accident diminishes when the
defendant has engaged in a pattern of abuse against the victim.  
Probably the most widely publicized litigation involving an
effort to introduce evidence of past abuse to show motive is the
O.J. Simpson prosecution.85 In that case, the prosecution was
successful in admitting some of the evidence (which included
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85. No. BA 0 9 7211 (Cal. App. Dep’t., Super. Ct., Oct. 3, 1995). 
86. David Gargolick, Prosecutors Win Key Simpson Fight: Judge Allows
Most Material About Domestic Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1995,
at B8.   
87. Lisa A. Linsky, Use of Domestic Violence History Evidence in the
Criminal Prosecution: A Common Sense Approach, 16 PACE L. REV.
73, 74 (1995).  Of course, in this case such evidence did not lead
to conviction, but in many cases it would.
88. Klein & Orloff, supra note 2, at 848-876.    
89. 229 Cal. Rptr. 317, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).  The decision was a
departure from prior precedent, which permitted evidence of
prior crimes to prove a defendant’s identity only where the char-
acteristics of the prior bad acts were similar enough to the
charged crime to raise an inference that the crime was committed
by the same person. Id.
90. See e.g., People v. Santarelli, 401 N.E. 2d 199 (N.Y. 1980) (evi-
dence of prior bad acts may be admitted in anticipation of dis-
proving defendant’s anticipated defense that he was legally insane
at the time of the crime); Solomon v. State, 646 A.2d 1064, 1082-
83 (Md. App. 1994) (evidence of prior crimes may be admitted to
counter anticipated defense).
91. Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce:
Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 366
(1997), citing Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women:
The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44
VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1085 (1991); see also Roberta L. Valente,
Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role of the Family Law
Practitioner, 29 FAM. L.Q. 187, 191 (1995).  
92. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109 (2002) provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal
action in which the defendant is accused of an offense
involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s
commission of other domestic violence is not made inad-
missible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible
pursuant to Section 352.
(b)  In an action in which evidence is to be offered under this
section, the people shall disclose the evidence to the defen-
dant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the
substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, in
compliance with the provisions of Section 1054.7 of the
Penal Code.
(c) This section shall not be construed to limit or preclude the
admission or consideration of evidence under any other
statute or case law.
(d) As used in this section, “domestic violence” has the mean-
ing set forth in Section 13700 of the Penal Code. . . .
(e) Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the
charged offense is inadmissible under this section, unless
the court determines that the admission of this evidence is
in the interest of justice. 
93. For opposing views on Fed. R. Evid. 413-414, compare Bridging
the Gap, supra note 9, with James L. McCandless, Prior Bad Acts
and Two Bad Rules: The Fundamental Unfairness of Federal Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 689 (1997).    
94. Bridging the Gap, supra note 9, at 381. 
95. Proposals to follow California’s lead and adopt rules admitting
prior abuse evidence in domestic violence cases are being devel-
oped in other states as well.  See e.g., The Search for Truth, supra
note 9 (describing a proposal for an evidentiary rule for Hawaii
that would broadly admit prior abuse evidence in domestic vio-
lence cases).
testimony, photographs, “911” tape-recorded phone call by
victim) of physical beatings and threats by the defendant going
back several years from the date of the murder.86 The evidence
was admitted “to provide the jury with an appreciation of the
‘nature and quality’ of the relationship between Mr. Simpson
and Ms. Brown, and to aid in establishing motive, intent, plan,
and identity of the killer.”87
In the protection order context, evidence of prior abuse may
be relevant to prove the batterer’s intent, motive, or absence of
mistake.  For example, intent is an element of assault, battery,
and false imprisonment, all of which are included within the
definition of abuse in most protection order statutes.88
Evidence of prior abuse has also been admitted to prove
identity in criminal prosecutions.  In a leading California case,
People v. Zack,89 the defendant was charged with murdering his
girlfriend by beating her to death.  The California Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of
prior abuse against the victim to prove identity when the defen-
dant contended he was out of town the night of the murder. 
Evidence of prior bad acts may also be admissible to negate
anticipated defenses.  Again, this theory is not well developed
in the civil context, but there is ample precedent on the crim-
inal side for allowing prosecutors to admit evidence of a defen-
dant’s prior crimes in their case in chief  to counter anticipated
defenses.90 An increasingly common defense in protection
order and custody cases in which allegations of abuse are made
is that the victim has a motive to fabricate the allegations to
gain an advantage in a divorce or custody case.91 If the bat-
terer claims that the victim
fabricated some or all of the
allegations, the lawyer can
argue that evidence of prior
abuse should be admitted to
rebut this defense claim. 
Finally, at least one state,
California, has adopted a rule of
evidence that provides specifi-
cally for the admissibility of
prior bad act evidence to prove
propensity in domestic violence
cases under certain circum-
stances.92 California’s new rule
is based upon the recently enacted Federal Rules of Evidence 413
and 414, which permit, under certain circumstances, the admis-
sion of uncharged acts in sexual assault and child molestation
cases to show propensity and disposition.93 These “groundbreak-
ing” rules were enacted because of congressional “outrage that the
Federal Rules of Evidence were being used to keep the jurors from
finding out about the extremely probative evidence of uncharged
rapes unless the attacks were extremely similar in the facts.”94
While California’s rule only applies to criminal prosecutions for
domestic violence, practitioners may use it to argue for similar
treatment in civil cases in their jurisdictions.  The new California
rule may also reflect a trend in which legislators and judges rec-
ognize the distinctive nature of domestic violence cases and the
need to modify evidentiary rules to address these cases.95
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CONCLUSION
As states pass more laws enhancing the remedies available
to victims of domestic violence and recognizing its devastating
effects on children, the historical informality of these proceed-
ings is likely to fade and be replaced by greater adherence to
traditional rules of evidence. We have identified three types of
evidence that pose the greatest challenges for courts.   This
article outlines the kinds of considerations courts might use
(1) to admit expert opinion to enhance the understanding of
the effects of battering; (2) to benefit from the evidence gener-
ated due to a concurrent criminal actions while blunting
efforts of alleged perpetrators to manipulate that system; and
(3) to cope with the difficult admissibility problems posed by
the batterers’ prior acts of abuse. Understanding the dynamics
of abuse and its evidentiary consequences can help a court get
a more accurate picture of the abusive context and will go a
long way in protecting victims of domestic violence and their
children. 
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